PyPI 上的 LiteLLM 1.107.0 被植入凭据窃取程序与后门

• Oct 21, 2026 • 4 min read The LiteLLM 1.107.0 release on PyPI carries a credential stealer and a remote code execution backdoor. All seven wheels (Linux, macOS, Windows) install them as three files in site-packages. Both run when any Python process starts on the host, even one that never imports litellm. The upstream GitHub source does not contain them. Versions 1.106.2, 1.107.0rc1, and 1.107.0rc2 are clean. What the attack does Installing litellm==1.107.0 places three files in site-packages. Python loads two of them each time it starts. 1. cook.pth imports cook.py, a credential stealer. It collects SSH keys, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, AI tool tokens, browser passwords, and the LLM provider keys in a LiteLLM proxy database. It encrypts the data and sends it to www.litellm[.]dev. 2. sitecustomize.py starts a background daemon. Every hour, the daemon reads a server address from a GitHub file, runs the stealer again, and downloads and runs code from that server. How the implant got into the release The pyproject.toml in the 1.107.0 source distribution (sdist) has one extra line in the maturin build section: pyproject.toml (litellm-1.107.0.tar.gz) TOML 6 lines The maturin data = "cook" setting copies a cook/ folder into litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/ in the wheel. pip installs that folder into site-packages. The sdist leaves out the cook/ folder, so this line is the only visible change. The upstream pyproject.toml at tag v1.107.0 has no data = "cook" line and no cook/ folder. Someone changed the build outside the public repository. SafeDep infers a compromised release pipeline or stolen PyPI credentials. The wheel RECORD lists the three added files: litellm-1.107.0.dist-info/RECORD TEXT 4 lines Payload 1: the credential stealer in cook.py At startup, Python runs each line that starts with import in a .pth file in site-packages. cook.pth contains import cook, so the stealer runs in every Python process on the host: the application, pip, IDE language servers, and CI jobs. cook.py wraps about 61 KB of Python in one layer of exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode('...'))). The decoded code starts with this configuration: cook.py (decoded) PYTHON 10 lines What it collects Module Targets sysinfo, netinfo Host name, user, operating system, IP addresses, network settings browser_pw Chromium saved passwords, decrypted with the profile master key (DPAPI on Windows). Firefox logins.json and key4.db browser_hist Browser history ssh_keys ~/.ssh/* shell_hist bash and zsh history, PowerShell PSReadLine, cmd history cloud_creds ~/.aws/credentials and config, Azure profile and tokens, gcloud credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, gh hosts.yml, rclone.conf, ~/.netrc dev_secrets .pem, .key, .pfx, .p12, .pk8, .ppk files under $HOME, Composer auth.json, FileZilla saved servers container_creds Kubernetes service account token cicd_secrets GitLab runner config.toml, Jenkins initialAdminPassword and master.key, .vault-token, Terraform credentials.tfrc.json, Packer settings ai_devtools Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, VS Code mcp.json, Gemini CLI, Codex auth.json, Continue, Aider, Goose, opencode, Qwen, Crush, Kiro, Zed, Hugging Face token env_vars Its own environment and the environment of other processes through /proc/<pid>/environ db_litellm Reads DATABASE_URL and dumps the LiteLLM_CredentialsTable and LiteLLM_ProxyModelTable tables, which hold the LLM provider API keys of a LiteLLM proxy cloud_metadata AWS instance metadata service (IMDSv2, then v1): instance identity and role credentials gpg_keys, tls_privkey GPG keys, TLS private keys How it sends the data 1. It encrypts the JSON results with a random AES-256-CBC key, and encrypts that key with RSA-OAEP and the embedded public key. 2. It packs the result into a tar.gz (hdr.json, data.bin, key.bin) and sends it in a POST request to www.litellm[.]dev/healthcheck with the header X-Token: XWiA8gZNa7NcX2XRoAEb. 3. After a successful upload, it writes /tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb so it collects only once per host. It also sets PRIVCOLLECT_ACTIVE=1 to avoid a second run in the same process tree. Payload 2: the backdoor in sitecustomize.py Python imports sitecustomize at startup, so this file also runs in every Python process. sitecustomize.py PYTHON 5 lines 1. It takes an exclusive lock on /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock, so only one daemon runs per host. 2. It calls fork() and setsid(), sends standard input and output to /dev/null, and changes directory to / to detach from the parent process. 3. Every hour, it: 1. reads domain.txt from the attacker’s GitHub repository and takes the first line that looks like a domain, 2. runs its embedded copy of the stealer, which has no once-per-host marker, 3. downloads http://<domain>/codepy and runs it with exec(). The attacker can point the daemon at a new server by editing domain.txt. Each infected host runs whatever that server returns as codepy. Indicators of compromise Network Indicator Purpose www.litellm[.]dev, hxxp://www.litellm[.]dev/healthcheck Receives stolen data HTTP header X-Token: XWiA8gZNa7NcX2XRoAEb Sent with each upload raw.githubusercontent[.]com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain.txt Backdoor reads its server address here hxxp://<domain>/codepy Second-stage code download Requests to 169.254.169.254 from Python processes Theft of AWS instance credentials Host Indicator Meaning cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py in site-packages Implant installed /tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb Stealer already uploaded data /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock Backdoor daemon has run Environment variable PRIVCOLLECT_ACTIVE=1 Present in infected processes Detached Python daemon (parent PID 1, own session, working directory /) Backdoor loop File hashes (SHA-256) File SHA-256 litellm-1.107.0.tar.gz 2befe2a79fb4fbbd9a543b5b40b530c8cffa8771bab22b8fb22b2e4ae3b1f819 litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl 462d0c9f67ca522d9e0e4acd245e90b36ce0d5353604a66bb7c43a1ec4a6fcf7 litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl 668169d35b87bf51324080390b1b1c5ab12bd335cfe5f1a99e3689abd5e02ae6 litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl 1bbce8caa94f01c0aaa0b7ddae51553a8a32e1ce53d96d44fe583272aff7ad00 litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl c2e32d0ce2548aa662c18bf5001911a79fe5b30cf8357132275add02fdcde054 litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-macosx_10_12_x86_64.whl 7598727f209d717041db37f7dca271d3a7d328a279890e0e1d55375729aeb86d litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl 0aaf7ba346d41ef2f40390436738b001180d5a1c03aa093f121078a9969d9a1a litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-win_amd64.whl 12d4ccc5c6f8d35cf4f2cf233b7f3e418e863e657d81ff5f5fc9e210005b9484 The planted files, from the wheel RECORD: File SHA-256 (URL-safe base64) cook.pth fxkWMucyBwXRVLhSBPGuVGtUOsvX6IYSKbdvUEK5K9s cook.py ndCjkm-Wo364bPHuIxDZvpMTnMTr7z754u_pUxOQviU sitecustomize.py NL7wT-iKydCq4EdWMLFzhoHRW5TyM6yKpG6s9ZaDBfo - pypi - python - malware - supply-chain - litellm Author Kunal Singh The Latest from SafeDep blogs Follow for the latest updates and insights on open source security & engineering Background SafeDep Logo Ship Code. 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